How the IDF Missed Hamas’ October 7 Attack: A Look into Israel’s Security Oversight

A document obtained by the Jewish News Agency (AJN) revealed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and intelligence systems were aware of Hamas’ plans to carry out an attack on October 7, two weeks in advance. The IDF Division specializing in the Gaza Strip had compiled a report titled “Detailed End-to-End Raid Training,” which outlined Hamas’ intentions to kill and kidnap 250 people. Israeli intelligence officials closely monitored the exercise, with Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari describing it as a complex and high-risk operation. Despite having precise information about Hamas’ plans, the IDF failed to act on warning signals due to possible negligence of senior commanders or prevailing conceptions in the state security establishment. The presence of a sophisticated new security barrier completed two years before the attack was believed to deter such an assault; however, it ultimately failed, leading to a major intelligence and security oversight. The General Staff investigation team was expected to present initial conclusions of this failure to the Chief of the General Staff as Israeli society sought to understand how such a security breach could occur despite detailed knowledge of the enemy’s plans.